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Technology as an Imperative for
Regulating Copyright: From the Public
Exploitation to the Private Use of the
Work
Séverine Dusollier
(!;V Access; Copyright circumvention devices; Digital technology; Fair
dealing; Internet; Transient copying
It is often said that regulation of the internet should aim at being technol-
ogy-neutral. This idea was regularly heard in the copyright arena. However,
one cannot doubt that this technology-neutrality is anything but a false
pretence when it cornes to the recent changes in copyright law. Two exam-
pIes, the temporary reproduction and the legal protection of technological
measures, underline the perverted role of technology in dictating what
copyright should look like. This opinion aims at explaining how this bas
happened and to what extent this "technological mandate" bas brought
about a radical shift of the copyright regime.
Copyright as a legal tool to regulate the public exploitation
of artistic works
Copyright has always been a "doctrine of public places"! in the sense that
the very objective and justification of copyright is to enable the author or
copyright owner to control the transmission ofhis or her work to the public,
whether by means of reproduction and distribution of copies to the public
or by communication of the work to the public. This basic rule of copyright
is rooted in the philosophical and economic grounds of granting an exclu-
sive right to creators. As a consequence, many provisions of copyright
revolve around the notion of the public. Private acts of use, such as commu-
nication within the family circle, are excluded from the scope of copyright.
Definitions of the exclusive rights require the element of a public: for
instance, a copy is deemed to be a reproduction when a material fixation of
a work enables the perception of the work or, as in the French definition of
the reproduction right, its communication to the public in an indirect
manner.
The natural scope of copyright is thus to control the public diffusion of
the work to a public, taken as a whole.2 One can translate this idea by saying
that the centre of attention for copyright is the exploitation of a work, where
exploitation is defined as public diffusion. Copyright has never been about
regulating access to or use of works. Access to works is made possible and
regulated either by the property right in the original embodiment of the
work, or by entering into a contract with a distributor to get a material copy
of the work. This key distinction between exploitation and access/use sim-
ply resulted from the key principle of the separation of the intellectual
object, the work, and the material object embodying it. This is currently
changing, however.
The case of the temporary copy and the new technical
definition of reproduction
When copyright was chosen as the means to protect computer programs,
the worm started eating the fruit. It was felt necessary to prevent uses of
software by multiple users from one single copy hosted on a shared server.
ln the European Union, the solution that was then found was to include in
the reproduction right any temporary fixation of a computer program.
Therefore any copy made in the RAM of the computers technically needed
to use the software was considered as an infringement of the reproduction
right. Only an exception exempting acts of normal use of the software limits
this new scope of copyright.
1 P. Goldstein, Copyright's Highway. From
Gutenberg to the Celestial Jukebox (New
York, 1994), p.201.
2 This argument is more thoroUghly
addressed in S. Dusollier, Droit d'auteur et
protection des œuvres dans l'univers
numérique-Droits et exceptions à la lumière
des dispositifs de verrouillage des oeuvres
CLarcier, Bruxelles, 2005), nos 419 et seq.
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The same construction (broad right defined by a technical fact only
limited by a conditional exception) has since been adopted for any types of
works, hence becoming an overall rule of the EU copyright framework.
Defining the right of reproduction by a technical occurrence, (i.e. an act
of fixation) departs from the traditional legal definition of that right: the
reproduction of a work implies the exclusive right of the author if it is a
fixation (technical criterion) enabling the perception of the work to the
public (legal criterion). Technical fixation alone does not suffice.
By protecting any act of technical fixation, it is the mere use of the work
that is protected. That prerogative of the rightholder should not be included
in his or her copyright, but arises only from the licence contract that is
signed with users of the work. A confusion between the natural scope of
copyright, as a right protecting the intellectual property, and the subsidiary
foie of contract and/or property rules as the normal framework to protect
the distribution of copies of the work is hence added to the conceptual
mistake in the legal notion of the reproduction right.3
Besides, leaving out the mere use of a copyrighted work through a rule of
exception to an exclusive right is not really legally secure. An exception is
subjected to a strict interpretation, can be contracted out in many countries
and can be limited by the application of the three-step test. It would have
been legally sounder to limit the right of the copyright owner not by an
exception but by a proper definition of rus or her exclusive right of repro-
duction, leaving the mere use of the work beyond the scope of the copyright
monopoly.
The case of DAM and the new technical definition of the
extent and limits of copyright
Such confusion between intellectual work and material abject, similarly
resulting from a technological imperative, also appears in relation to tech-
nological measures and the way copyright has protected them. As a brief
reminder, different types of technological measures ("TM"), based on
cryptography or other technical means, have been developed in the last few
years to address the thorny issue of protecting and managing lPR in a
digital environment. Such TM are commonly referred to as DRM (digital
rights management). As soon as technology has been envisaged to enhance
an effective exercise of copyright, it has been feared that similar technology
might be used to defeat the technical protection. Building a technical fence
around works was not considered sufficient. lt was felt that legal protection
of such technical protection was needed tao. ln other words, the fence had
to be electrified: acts of disabling the technical barrier had to be pun-
ished.
The WIPO Treaties of 1996 enacted such protection and were followed
by many countries, such as the United States or the Member States of the
European Union. The relevant pieces of legislation in those countries,
known as anti-circumvention provisions, prohibit the act of circumvention
itself of the TM and so-called preparatory activities, i.e. any act of distribu-
tion and manufacture of devices enabling or facilitating the circumven-
tion.
The anti-circumvention provisions are the most interesting battlefield
between the traditional vision of the copyright law and the dictates of
technology. Here again, the latter won. The scope of copyright is no longer
decided according to what the proper scope should be, but according to
what the technology can do.
On one hand, the definition of the TM systematically refers not to the
exclusive rights of the copyright owner but to what the copyright owner is
able to protect through technology. ln the Digital Millenriium Copyright
Act, i. e. the US Act that protects TM, a TM is protected against circum-
vention if it contrais the rights of the copyright owner or if it contrais access
to the works. As to the latter, the case law has construed the notion of TM
controlling access so broadly that it basically covers any technülogy under
the sun.4 If, by using the work, one is in one way or another faced with the
operation of a TM, even without noticing it, that TM is, under this case
law, a TM controlling the access to the work. The mere existence of a TM
makes it a TM protected against circumvention!
3 Dusollier, ibid., nos 477 et seq.
4 See, e.g. Universal City Studios, lnc v
Shawn C. Reimerdes 111 F. Supp. 2d 294
(S.D. N. Y. 2000) conf'd, 273 F. 3d 429 (2d
Ciro 2001); United States of America v Elcom
Ltd & Dmitry Sklyarov 203 F. Supp. 2d
1111 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Lexmark lnt'l v
Static Control Components, lnc 2003 V.S.
Dist. LEXIS 3734 CE.D. Ky 2003); 321
Studios v Metro Golda!)ln Mayer Studios, lnc
No.C 02-1955 SI (N.D. Cal. 2004).
[2005] B.I.P.R ISSUE 6 0 SWEET & MAXWELL UMrrED [AND CONTRIBUTORS]
OPINION: [2005] E.I.P.R. 203
It is the SaIne in the European Union where the TM is protected by the
EU Directive of 2001 on copyright in the information society, as soon as it
protects an "act non authorized by the right holder".5 One could not dream
Qf a better tautology: obviously, since the rightholder has decided to techni-
cally protect an act of use related to his or her work, it means that he or she
was willing not to authorise such an act. Any TM is then addressed by the
EU anti-circumvention protection.
ln the United States and the EU, the technological capacity dictates the
legal scope of protection. Any use of a work enters, through the legal
prohibition of the circumvention of a TM, into the arena of contraI granted
to copyright holders.
This brand-new scope of copyright protection is not even limited by any
limitations, exceptions or fair use provisions. Both the DM CA and the EU
2001 Copyright Directive state that the TM prevails over the exercise of fair
use or exceptions to copyright.6 The legitimacy, under copyright law, of
making a private copy, a parody, a criticism or an educational or research
use do es not matter as soon as a technical mechanism is able to inhibit such
use or copy of the work. Such exceptions excuse neither an act of circum-
vention nor an act of trafficking in circumvention devices. Armed with TM
and anti-circumvention laws, the rightholder is now entitled to prevent the
users from making fair use of copyrighted works. That clearly results from
the EU Directive and from the US DMCA. Both texts provide for some
safeguarding provisions, but those are rather limited and insufficient. The
US legislation only lays down a list ofvery restricted and ill-founded excep-
tions to the circumvention prohibition 7 and entrusts an administrative body
with the evaluation of the "adverse effect on fair use" that the application
of the anti-circumvention provision might have.8 The EU Directive imposes
on Member States the duty to find solutions so that the legitimate user of
a work is able to benefit from some exceptions, albeit the presence of a
TM.9 But this solution is limited to some exceptions and largely leaves
room to the intervention of the copyright holders themselves. If they pro-
pose anything to address those exceptions, the lawmaker is no longer
obliged to rule on the matter.
Copyright owners are thus granted some legitimacy in controlling,
through technology, acts of use traditionally exempted by copyright law.
Here also, what technology can do becomes what the extent of copyright
should be. The social and public justifications for permitting some uses of
copyrighted works stand aside to let the technology deploy its whole
capacity. TM are becoming substitutes for copyright even though they are
still broadly advertised as mere complements to it. The WIPO Treaties only
concerned TM that prevent uses covered by copyright and gave immunity
to copyright exceptions and limitations. Conversely, the EU and US anti-
circumvention provisions address any use that technology can encapsulate
and consider exceptions and fair use as nothing but failures of the copyright
body that technology can heal.
The shift of the copyright regime to the control of access to
and use of the work by individuals
The legal treatment of the temporary copy and the extension of the scope
of copyright through technological measures and anti-circumvention provi-
sions are only symptoms of a more insidious illness contaminating copy-
right in favour of the digital environment. Regulating the simple use of the
works, or the access to the works, by TM, anti-circumvention laws and
temporary reproduction rights enable the regulation of the distribution of
the work to any individual. From the exploitation of the work, its diffusion
to the public as a whole, the copyright bas shifted to the contraI of the
business model, aided by technology, of the distribution of copyrighted
works to individuals. This was the main goal of some copyright owners.
This move bas distorted the copyright law to an extent that we are only
beginning to experience and understand. The technology that helps achieve
it was bath the pretext and the means to accomplish that shift of copy-
right.
How we should address this substitution of the foundations and princi-
pIes of copyright by rules imposed by mere technical facts is one of the key
5 Art.6 §3 of Directive 2001/29 on
copyright and related rights in me
information society, of May 22, 2001.
6 As it results, for me DCMA at least for
TM controlling access to works, from case
law (Universal City StUdios, lnc v Eric Corley
273 F. 3d 429, 459 (2d Ciro 2001); United
States of America v Elcom Ltd, n.4 above, at
[19]; 321 Studios v Metro Gold!l!)ln Mayer
StUdios, n.4 above; and, for me EV
Copyright Directive, from me definition of
me protected TM and from me need of a
safeguarding mechanism for some
exceptions as laid down in its Art.6 §4.
7 17V.S.C.§1201(d)-G).
8 17 V.S.C. §1201(a)(C). Two evaluations
have already taken place; see Copyright
Office, "Exemption to Prohibition on
Circumvention of Copyright Protection
Systems for Access Control Technologies",
October 27, 2000, Library of Congress;
Federal Register, Vol.65, October 31,2000,
Rules and regulations, p. 64556; ibid.,
October 28, 2003, Library of Congress,
Federal Register, vol.68, October 31, 2003,
Rules and Regulations, p.620 Il.
9 Art.6 §4 of me Copyright Directive of
2001.
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questions in copyright today. Failing to give an adequate and balanced
answer to it would be stealing copyright from the public and giving it to the
industry. The public is becoming more and more contemptuous of copy-
right. This leads to an increasing tendency to infringe copyright. P. Gold-
stein once said that one great virtue of copyright is its balance, "one that
weighs authors' interests against the need for public access. This balance
bas withstood, and been shaped by, the test of tim~ and, however incom-
pletely, bas won civil obedience through the reasonableness of its com-
mand".lo
By putting technology on the throne of copyright to achieve a more fine-
grained control of the use of the work by individuals, one can only engender
greater civil disobedience. Technology as a tool to help copyright in the
digital age would then finally be the end of copyright.
Thwarting this evolution should rest on a proper understanding of the
very nature of technology and the way it interacts with law. By its very
nature, technology is prosthetic: it creates a shortfall and substitutes for that
failure rather that completing it. For instance, the typewriter was originally
invented to enable the blind to write, to access a mechanical writing tech-
nique .11 Finally used by everybody, the typewriter has changed the way we
write and communicate. When using such a machine, one bas to unlearn
the vision of the touch and appropriate a sort ofblindness. Technology was
created to remedy a deficiency but, in order to operate fully, it created in
itself a similar deficiency. The use of technology in copyright is alike. It is
a solution to a lack of an effective protection of copyright. However, in
order to deploy its full operation and power, it bas to create an absence of
copyright or at least a dissimulation of copyright behind the dictates of
technology. Restoring the law in copyright, going back to its source princi-
pIes, is the only solution to keep a fair balance in intellectual property and
to use technology as an adequate tool and aid. The application of a technol-
ogy-aided paradigm of copyright is about managing the relationship
between technology and copyright law, not about replacing one by another.
However, this is not the path that current copyright lawmakers have
decided to follow.
10 P. Goldstein, "Copyright and lu
Substitutes" [1997] Wis. L. Rev. 870.
II The analogy is taken from B. Preciado,
Le Manifeste Contra-Sexuel, 2000.
SÉVERINE D usa U.IER
University of Namur
Belgium
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